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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Minnesota was the breeding ground for judicial candidates’ 
newly won First Amendment rights and is now a testing ground for 
the encroachment of partisanship into non-partisan judicial 
elections.1  Litigation pressed by Minnesotans culminated in the 
United States Supreme Court decision Republican Party of Minnesota 
v. White,2 which freed judicial candidates to voice their views on 
legal and political issues.3  Now, more than five years later, 
Minnesotans continue to debate the impact of that decision and 
that of its progeny on the state’s judicial elections.4  The central 
issue is whether increasing involvement of political parties and 
related interests in judicial elections will diminish the judiciary’s 
ability to be fair and impartial.5
This article examines the judicial selection system established 
by the state’s constitutional founders, a system largely intact today, 
as well as the selection process that has developed in recent 
decades.6  The article also presents court decisions expanding 
judicial candidates’ rights to free political speech in their 
campaigns, and examines how those decisions have affected 
Minnesota’s elections to date.7  Finally, the article discusses the 
threat of partisanship in judicial elections, the future of elections in 
Minnesota, and potential reforms to deter partisanship.8
II. THE FOUNDATION OF MINNESOTA’S JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEM 
As Minnesota approached statehood, Republicans and 
Democrats held separate conventions to draft the state’s 
constitution in 1857.9  Convention delegates debated the potential 
methods of selecting judges, and both conventions chose a system 
of judicial elections, rather than the federal system of lifetime 
 1. See infra Part IV. 
 2. 536 U.S. 765, 774−75 (2002). 
 3. Id. at 788. 
 4. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII. 
 5. See infra Part VII. 
 6. See infra Parts II, III. 
 7. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 8. See infra Parts VI, VIII. 
 9. See Laura Benson, The Minnesota Judicial Selection Process: Rejecting Judicial 
Elections in Favor of a Merit Plan, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 765, 768 (1993) 
(discussing the background of Minnesota’s judicial election process). 
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appointments.10  The constitution provided that “judges of the 
supreme court shall be elected by the electors of the state at large”11 
and district judges “shall be elected by the electors [of the judicial 
districts].”12  The constitution also provided for appointment of 
judges: “[i]n case the office of any judge shall become vacant 
before the expiration of the regular term for which he was elected, 
the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the governor until a 
successor is elected and qualified.”13
With minor exceptions, the system established at statehood 
remains in place 150 years later.  The term of office for judges was 
originally set at seven years, but was reduced to six years by 
constitutional amendment in 1883.14  The timing of the first 
election for an appointed judge was also changed.  Originally, 
judges ran for election “at the first annual election that occurs 
more than thirty days after the vacancy shall have happened.”15  In 
1956, a constitutional amendment changed this provision so that a 
judge runs for election “at the next general election occurring 
more than one year after [an] appointment.”16  Currently, the 
constitution provides: 
The term of office of all judges shall be six years and until 
their successors are qualified. They shall be elected by the 
voters from the area which they are to serve in the manner 
provided by law.17
Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of judge the 
governor shall appoint in the manner provided by law a 
qualified person to fill the vacancy until a successor is 
elected and qualified. The successor shall be elected for a 
six year term at the next general election occurring more 
than one year after the appointment.18
Thus, the constitution establishes a mixed system of 
appointments and elections.  The framers chose gubernatorial 
appointments, rather than special elections, as the method for 
 10. Id. at 768. 
 11. MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VI, § 3. 
 12. Id. at § 4. 
 13. Id. at § 10. 
 14. Act of March 1, 1883, 1883 Minn. Laws 9. 
 15. MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VI, § 10. 
 16. Act of April 15, 1955, ch. 881, 1955 Minn. Laws 1551.   
 17. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7. 
 18. Id. at § 8. 
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filling vacancies occurring before the end of judges’ terms.19  Soon 
after an appointment voters participate in the selection process, 
deciding whether to elect the appointee to a full term.20
In the first sixty years of statehood, elections played a greater 
role in selection of Minnesota Supreme Court justices.21  Through 
1917, half of the first thirty-two justices on the Minnesota Supreme 
Court were elected to office rather than appointed.22  Since then, 
appointments have predominated; only six out of the fifty-three 
justices who have taken office since 1917 were first elected to their 
positions.23
Supreme Court elections in the first decades of statehood were 
partisan contests.24  In 1912, however, the legislature “adopted a 
non-partisan ballot” for judicial elections,25 and they have 
continuously remained officially non-partisan.26  Finally, in 1949, 
the legislature changed the form of ballots by placing the word 
“incumbent” by the names of judges running for election, a 
practice that remains in place today.27
III. THE MODERN JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEM 
A. Growth of the Minnesota Judiciary 
As Minnesota has grown in population and complexity, the 
judiciary has increased in both numbers and relative prominence.  
In 1980, the Minnesota Supreme Court was comprised of nine 
justices.28  Additionally, there were seventy-two district court judges 
and 134 municipal or county court judges.29  By 1987, the 
municipal/county court system was merged into the district court 
 19. 1874 Minn. Laws 799. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Chronological List of Justices and Judges of the Minnesota Appellate 
Courts, Minn. State Law Library Docket Series, http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/ 
judges.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Benson, supra note 9. 
 25. Gwenyth Jones, By The People? Judicial Selection in Minnesota, BENCH & B. OF 
MINN. 18 (Feb. 1993). 
 26. Id. 
 27. MINN. STAT. § 204B.36, subdiv. 5 (2006); see also Jones, supra note 25, at 
19. 
 28. MINN. LEGIS. MANUAL 352 (1981–82). 
 29. Id. 
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system,30 and there were 217 district court judges.31  In 1982 
Minnesota voters approved a constitutional amendment 
establishing an intermediate court of appeals, and the supreme 
court was reduced to seven justices.32  By 2008, there will be 312 
judges in Minnesota: seven supreme court justices, nineteen court 
of appeals judges, and 286 district court judges.33
As the number of judicial positions has increased, the 
governor’s responsibilities in making appointments have grown.34  
An occasional gubernatorial task is now a monthly duty.35
B. Minnesota Commission on Judicial Selection 
As they were called on to make more judicial appointments, 
Minnesota governors created a process for screening judicial 
candidates.  Governors Al Quie and Rudy Perpich established 
commissions “to assist them in choosing judges.”36  For decades, the 
Minnesota State Bar Association and citizens’ groups lobbied for 
the creation of an “independent commission to screen judicial 
candidates based on merit.”37  An opportunity to create such a 
proposal arose because some criticized Governor Perpich’s judicial 
appointments as excessively political.38  In 1990, the Legislature 
established the Minnesota Commission on Judicial Selection to 
 30. MINN. STATE BAR ASS’N, FOR THE RECORD: 150 YEARS OF LAW & LAWYERS IN 
MINNESOTA 174 (1999) [hereinafter FOR THE RECORD]. 
 31. See generally MINN. LEGIS. MANUAL (1987–88). 
 32. MINN. STAT. §§ 480.01, 480.011 (2006); FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 
163. 
 33. 2007 Minn. Laws, ch. 54, art. 1, §§ 4–5, 2007 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. 161 
(West) (authorizing public safety appropriations for three new court of appeals 
seats and seven new trial court seats). 
 34. See MINN. CONST. art. V, § 3. 
     35.  During Governor Arne Carlson’s eight years in office (1991–99), he 
appointed ninety-six district court judges.  FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 179.  
Governor Jesse Ventura (1999–2003) appointed sixty district court judges.  T.W. 
Budig, Assistant Anoka County Attorney Sean Gibbs Appointed Tenth District Judge by 
Gov. Pawlenty, HOMETOWN SOURCE, Mar. 8, 2005, available at 
http//:www.hometownsource.com/capitol/2005/march/8gibbs.html.  In his first 
term, Governor Tim Pawlenty (2003–07) appointed fifty-one district court judges.  
See Minnesota Judicial Branch, Minnesota District Courts, http://www.mncourts. 
gov/?page=238 (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
 36. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 178. 
 37. Id.; see also Position Statement of Minnesota State Bar Association Judicial 
Merit Selection Committee (Oct. 16, 1987) (“The MSBA supports a statutory merit 
selection plan . . . .”) 
 38. Betty Wilson, Kelley Faults Perpich’s Choices for Judges, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Jan. 26, 1990, at B5. 
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recruit, screen and recommend to the governor candidates for 
appointment to the district courts.39
The Commission consists of forty-nine members, including 
nine at-large members and four members from each of the state’s 
ten judicial districts.40  Of the at-large members, the governor 
appoints seven, and the supreme court appoints two.41  The 
governor and supreme court each appoint two members from each 
judicial district.42  Three of the at-large members and two members 
from each district cannot be attorneys.43  Thirteen members meet 
to deliberate on each district court vacancy.  The nine at-large 
members are joined by the four members from the judicial district 
in which the vacancy occurs.44
The statute creating the Commission requires consideration of 
several factors in screening candidates: “integrity, maturity, health 
if job related, judicial temperament, diligence, legal knowledge, 
ability and experience, and community service.”45  After reviewing 
applications, conducting background checks, and interviewing 
candidates, the Commission recommends three to five finalists for 
each vacant position, and forwards those recommendations to the 
governor.46  The Commission seeks and receives significant input 
from the public while screening candidates.47  Since the 
Commission’s inception, governors have interviewed the finalists 
personally to select their appointees.48
While governors have constitutional authority to appoint any 
qualified person as a judge, they have nearly without exception 
chosen a finalist named by the Commission.49  The Commission has 
become recognized as a vital part of the selection process, helping 
 39. Elections and Ethics Reform Act, 1990 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 608 (West) 
(codified as Minn. Stat. § 480B.01 (2006)). 
 40. MINN. STAT. § 480B.01, subdiv. 2 (2006). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at subdiv. 3. 
 45. Id. at subdiv. 8. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at subdiv. 10.  See also Office of the Minnesota Governor, Tim Pawlenty: 
Commission on Judicial Selection, http://www.governor.state.mn.us/media 
center/pressreleases/JudicialSelections/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2007). 
 48. George Soule, Judicial Appointments in the Ventura Administration, 68 
HENNEPIN LAW., Nov. 1999 at 4; James H. Gilbert, The Appointment System Is Working 
Well, BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 1993 at 22, 26. 
 49. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 179. 
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to reduce politicization and promote merit-based selection.50  If the 
governor stacked the Commission with partisans, routinely ignored 
the Commission’s recommendations, or appointed unqualified 
political allies, the governor likely would pay the price in public 
opinion. 
The Commission’s role is confined to recommending 
candidates for appointment to the district court, and not the 
appellate courts.51  Recent governors have formed Commission-like 
committees to screen candidates for the court of appeals and 
supreme court.52  This process is not governed by Minnesota 
statutes.53
The vast majority of judges in Minnesota attain their office 
through appointment by the governor.54  Often, judges reach 
retirement age or decide to resign in the midst of a six year term, 
triggering a vacancy and gubernatorial appointment.55  A few 
judges have timed their departures to ensure that the governor can 
appoint a successor, rather than open the position for election.56  
In 2003, ninety-one percent of trial and appellate judges were 
initially appointed by the governor, including six out of seven  
supreme court justices.57
C. Judicial Elections 
Elections play a vital role in the judicial selection process.  
Elections provide a safety valve, a method for voters to replace a 
judge who has committed moral or ethical breaches or has not 
performed adequately.58  Elections make judges broadly 
 50. Id. 
 51. See About the Commission on Judicial Selection, http://www.governor. 
state.mn.us/mediacenter/pressreleases/JudicialSelections/PROD007916.html.  
The Commission also screens candidates for the Workers’ Compensation Court of 
Appeals. See MINN. STAT. §480B.01 subdiv. 1 (2006) (“If a judge of the district court 
or Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals dies, resigns, retires, or is removed 
during the judge's term of office, or if a new district or Workers' Compensation 
Court of Appeals judgeship is created, the resulting vacancy must be filled by the 
governor as provided in this section.”). 
 52. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 178. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Pam Louwagie, Voters in Judicial Elections Just Go Through the Motions, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 3, 2003 at A1. 
 55. Id. at A18. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 177. 
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accountable to the people they serve.  If judges perform poorly, it is 
more likely they will draw opponents for election. 
In recent elections, most judges have run unopposed to retain 
their seats.  In the six elections from 1996 through 2006, only 
thirty-one percent of Minnesota appellate judges, and eleven 
percent of district judges, have drawn opponents.59  In the last six 
elections, there have been only seven open seats, all for the district 
court, up for election.60  Supreme Court Justice Alan Page won the 
most recent open seat on an appellate court in 1992.61  None of the 
appellate judges running from 1996 to date were defeated.62  
Challengers defeated only five district court judges during this 
same period.63
Spending by candidates in contested judicial elections has 
been modest compared to spending by candidates for legislative or 
executive positions or by judicial candidates in partisan election 
states.  In the last six elections, incumbent appellate judges spent 
an average of $87,430 on campaigns in contested elections.64  
Appellate challengers spent an average of $4147.65  In district court 
races, incumbents spent an average of $19,359 in contested 
elections, while challengers spent an average of $9903.66
Former Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Edward Stringer 
spent the most money by a judicial candidate during this period: 
$305,616 in winning fifty-four percent of the vote in 1996.67  Only 
three other campaigns have exceeded $100,000 in spending: 
former supreme court Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz ($138,595) and 
Justice James Gilbert ($196,853) in 2000,68 and Susan Burke 
 59. Data compiled from Minnesota Secretary of State election results 
[hereinafter SOS Election Results] (on file with author). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Minnesota State Law Library: Chronological List of Justices and Judges 
of the Minnesota Appellate Courts, http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judges. 
html (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
 62. SOS Election Results, supra note 59. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., 1996 to 2006 CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE SUMMARIES, available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/all_pubs.htm 
[hereinafter 1996 to 2006 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARIES] (summary spreadsheets 
on file with author). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., 1996 CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
SUMMARY, tbl. E (1997), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/ 
Summary/CFSM_96.pdf; SOS Election Results, supra note 59. 
 68. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., 2000 CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
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($112,938), a successful candidate for an open seat on the 
Hennepin County District Court in 2004.69   
The spending by most challengers in appellate and district 
court elections was minimal or even non-existent.70  In 42 races, 
challengers spent less than $5,000, many spending so little that they 
did not need to file a campaign finance disclosure report.71  
Expenditures by candidates for open district court seats tended to 
be higher than by other district court candidates.72  In races for the 
seven open seats, eight candidates spent more than $40,000 each.73  
Several district court candidates largely self-financed their efforts, 
investing significant personal funds in their campaigns.74
D. The Model of Non-Partisanship 
Since the 1912 enactment of legislation making judicial 
elections non-partisan,75 Minnesota’s judicial elections have been 
largely devoid of partisanship.  The Minnesota Code of Judicial 
Conduct contained a number of restrictions to enforce non-
partisanship in judicial campaigns.  Since 1974, the Code included 
the Announce Clause, which provided that a judicial candidate 
shall not “announce his or her views on disputed legal or political 
issues.”76  The Code also prohibited a judicial candidate’s 
SUMMARY (2000), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/Summary/ 
summary00/index.html. 
 69. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., 2004 CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
SUMMARY, at 27–28 (2005), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/ 
Summary/CFSUMM2004.pdf. 
 70. See 1996 to 2006 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARIES, supra note 64. 
 71. Id.  A candidate “must begin to file the reports required by this section in 
the first year it receives contributions or makes expenditures in excess of $100 and 
must continue to file until the committee, fund, or party unit is terminated.” 
MINN. STAT. § 10A.20, subdiv. 1 (2006). 
 72. 1996 to 2006 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARIES, supra note 64. 
 73. Id. 
 74. In 2004, Susan Burke made personal contributions of $81,644 to her 
campaign, which spent a total of $112,938.  MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. 
DISCLOSURE BD., 2004 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARY, at 27–28 (2005), available at 
http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/Summary/CFSUMM2004.pdf.  Candi-
date John Mellbye contributed all of the money he spent on his 2006 campaign: 
$56,246.  Letter from John Mellbye, Judge, to Joyce Larson, Campaign Finance & 
Public Disclosure Board (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://www.cfbreport.state. 
mn.us/pdfStorage/2006/CampFin/YE/1409.pdf. 
 75. See supra Part II. 
 76. The Announce Clause went further than the ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct, which in 1990 replaced the Announce Clause with a prohibition on 
statements by judicial candidates “that commit or appear to commit the candidate 
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involvement in political party activities, appeals for support by 
political parties, or use of political party support in a judicial 
campaign.77
In the 1990s, there were efforts to involve political parties in 
judicial elections.  The Code of Judicial Conduct did not and could 
not preclude political parties from promoting candidates in judicial 
elections.  In 1998, the Republican Party of Minnesota amended its 
constitution to permit endorsements of judicial candidates,78 
although the Party voted not to endorse candidates for the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in that year’s election.79
At its 2000 state convention, the Republican Party issued its 
first modern endorsements for appellate court candidates.  The 
party endorsed Gregory Wersal in his challenge to supreme court 
Justice James Gilbert—who had been appointed to the court by 
Republican Governor Arne Carlson—and court of appeals judges 
G. Barry Anderson, Jill Halbrooks and James Harten.80  The court 
of appeals judges rejected the endorsements and requested the 
party not include them in any campaign activities.81  While the 
Republican Party was free to promote its endorsement of Mr. 
Wersal, the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited his use of the 
endorsement.82  Justice Gilbert prevailed in the election, winning 
sixty-nine percent of the vote.83
IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH FOR JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
A. Federal Court Decisions 
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, two-time Minnesota 
with respect to cases, controversies or issues likely to come before the court.”  
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000), cited in 
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 773 n.5 (2002). 
 77. See David Schultz, Judicial Selection in Minnesota: Options After Republican 
Party v. White, BENCH & B. MINN. 17 (Nov. 2005).   
 78. Robert Whereatt, GOP Weighs Whether to Endorse Judicial Candidates, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 14, 2002, at 20A. 
 79. Conrad deFiebre, In Close Vote, Delegates Reject Endorsing Judicial Candidates, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 21, 1998, at 13A. 
 80. Robert Whereatt, Republicans Make First Endorsements for a Supreme Court 
Justice, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 11, 2000, at 14A. 
 81. Robert Whereatt, Endorsed Judges Tell GOP to Stay Clear, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), June 13, 2000, at 1B. 
 82. MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(1), (A)(3)(d)(i). 
 83. SOS Election Results, supra note 59. 
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Supreme Court candidate Gregory Wersal and the state’s 
Republican Party challenged Minnesota’s Announce Clause on 
First Amendment grounds.84  Mr. Wersal claimed he was forced to 
abandon his 1996 election bid because of an ethics complaint 
stemming from his criticism of several recent Minnesota Supreme 
Court decisions.85  In 1998, Mr. Wersal renewed his bid for the 
bench.86  This time, however, Wersal sought an advisory opinion 
from the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board 
seeking to determine whether he would again face scrutiny for 
expressing his views.87  When the Board refused to issue an opinion, 
Wersal, along with the Republican Party of Minnesota, brought suit 
in federal court.88
The district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, upholding the constitutionality of the Announce 
Clause, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.89  In June 
2002 the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of 
appeals decision and struck down the Announce Clause.90  In 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Supreme Court held that 
the Announce Clause violated the First Amendment because it was 
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in 
preserving the state judiciary’s impartiality and appearance of 
impartiality.91
After remand of the White case, the plaintiffs continued their 
efforts to purge Minnesota’s restrictions on partisan activities in 
judicial elections.92  The plaintiffs prevailed again in August 2005 
when the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, struck 
down the Partisan-Activities Clause and the Solicitation Clause of 
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct.93  The court of appeals 
invalidated rules that judicial candidates could not identify 
themselves as members of a political party, attend or speak at 
 84. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768–69; Republican 
Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 746 (8th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. denied, 
2006 WL 152093 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2006). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (D. Minn. 
1999), aff’d, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001).
 90. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 766. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 93. Republican Party of Minn., 416 F.3d at 744. 
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political gatherings, or seek, accept or use political party 
endorsements.94  The court also invalidated the Solicitation Clause 
to the extent that it prohibited candidates from soliciting 
contributions by speaking to a large group or in signing a 
campaign letter.95  The plaintiffs had not challenged the restriction 
on a candidate personally soliciting contributions from 
individuals.96
Other courts have also ruled on the constitutionality of 
restrictions on judicial campaign activities.  In Weaver v. Bonner, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals struck down provisions of the 
Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited judicial 
candidates from (a) making communications that are false or 
contain a material misrepresentation, and (b) personally soliciting 
campaign contributions and publicly stated support.97  The court 
stated that the First Amendment protects false communications 
unless they are made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless 
disregard as to whether they are false.98
Several federal courts have also struck down the Pledges and 
Promises and Commitment Clauses of state judicial conduct 
codes.99  The courts held that rules prohibiting judicial candidates 
from making pledges or promises of conduct other than the 
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office, or 
 94. Id. at 763–66. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 765. 
 97. 309 F.3d 1312, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Indiana Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879 (N.D. Ind. 
2006); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Kan 2006); Ala. 
Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Alaska 
2005); N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. N.D. 2005); Family 
Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004).  But see 
Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d. 968 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (holding that 
Wisconsin’s Pledges, Promises, and Commitments Clause was constitutionally 
permissible even though a particular recusal provision was void for vagueness and 
overbreadth); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003)(upholding disciplinary 
charges against judge for campaign statements such as “[p]olice officers expect 
judges . . . to help law enforcement by putting criminals where they belong . . . 
behind bars” as “pledges or promises” of conduct in office, which violated the 
state’s Code of Judicial Conduct, not protected by the First Amendment); In re 
Watson, 763 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. 2003) (upholding disciplinary charges against 
judge who stated during his campaign that “[w]e are in desperate need of a judge 
who will work with police, not against them.  We need a judge who will assist our 
law enforcement officers as they aggressively work towards cleaning up our city 
streets” as pledges and promises that are not protected by the First Amendment). 
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statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with 
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come 
before the court, violated the First Amendment.100  Each of the 
courts sustained code provisions that require a judge to disqualify 
himself or herself in any proceeding in which his or her 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.101
B.  Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken a conservative 
approach in amending the state’s Code of Judicial Conduct in 
response to the White decisions.  The court issued rule changes 
after each White decision.  In the first round, in September 2004, 
the court deleted the Announce Clause, clarified the Pledges and 
Promises Clause, and amended the prohibition on candidate 
misrepresentations by banning false campaign statements only if 
they were made “knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the 
truth.”102  The court also added a provision requiring a judge to 
disqualify himself or herself where “the judge, while a judge or a 
candidate for judicial office, has made a public statement that 
commits the judge with respect to: (i) an issue in the proceeding; 
or (ii) the controversy in the proceeding.”103  The court “decline[d] 
to adopt the . . . amendments [recommended by an advisory 
committee] expanding the scope of permissible partisan political 
activity. . . .  [W]e are not convinced the recommended changes 
are either necessary or desirable on their merits.”104
The second round of rule changes was made in March 2006.  
The court struck down provisions that precluded judicial 
candidates from identifying themselves as members of a political 
organization, attending or making speeches to political gatherings, 
or seeking or using endorsements from political organizations.105  
The court also amended the Code to allow judicial candidates to 
personally solicit publicly stated support from individuals and 
organizations.106  While the former Code completely prohibited 
 100. See cases cited supra note 99. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Order In re Amendment of the Code of Judicial Conduct, No. C4-85-697 
(Sept. 14, 2004).
 103. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(1)(e) (2007). 
 104. Order In re Amendments of the Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 102.
 105. Order In re Amendments of the Code of Judicial Conduct, No. C4-85-697 
(Mar. 29, 2006).
 106. Id. 
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candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions, the 
amendments permit a candidate to “make a general request for 
campaign contributions when speaking to an audience of 20 or 
more people; and . . . sign letters, for distribution by the 
candidate’s campaign committee, soliciting campaign 
contributions . . . .”107  The campaign still must ensure that the 
candidate will not learn the identity of those who made 
contributions to the campaign, or those who were solicited but did 
not contribute.108
Going into the 2008 elections, candidates will be permitted to 
engage in a wide range of political activities.109  But, unless the 
court issues additional changes, candidates will not be able to 
personally solicit or receive campaign contributions from 
individuals or make pledges or promises “with respect to cases, 
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court.”110  
In addition, a candidate risks disqualification as the judge in a 
proceeding if he or she makes a “public statement that commits the 
judge with respect to . . . an issue . . . or the controversy in the 
proceeding.111
V. POST-WHITE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN MINNESOTA 
The United States Supreme Court’s opinion in White was 
announced on June 27, 2002.112  While White opened the door to 
some partisan campaign activity, Minnesota’s judicial campaigns in 
2002, 2004 and 2006 did not change significantly from those in 
prior years. 
The number of contested judicial elections has not increased.  
In the 2004 and 2006 elections, three supreme court justices ran 
without challengers.113  Only eight percent of district court judges 
up for election in those years drew opponents.114  Spending on 
judicial races also has not changed appreciably since the White 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Barbara L. Jones, With “White” Now the Law, Judicial Races are in for a 
Change, MINN. LAWYER, Jan. 30, 2006, http://www.minnlawyer.com/story.cfm?id= 
4848. 
 110. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(3)(d) (2007). 
 111. Id. at 3(D)(1)(e). 
 112. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 113. SOS Election Results, supra note 59. 
 114. Id. 
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decision.115  The only exception was that in 2006 three challengers 
to district court judges were well-funded, each spending more than 
$30,000.116
In the post-White elections, there has been little partisan 
activity and judicial candidates have focused principally on their 
qualifications and experience.117  There have been a few minor 
exceptions.  Bemidji lawyer Tim Tinglestad ran for the supreme 
court in 2004 on a conservative, faith-based platform.118  The 
Minnesota Family Council published a voter’s guide that year, 
focused on issues such as taxpayer funding of abortion, the right to 
assisted suicide, and same-sex marriage.119  Although the 
Republican Party did not endorse any judicial candidates in 2004, it 
issued a voter’s guide—“a brief overview of relevant facts relating to 
[judicial candidates’] qualifications and abilities to be a member of 
the judiciary.”120
In 2006, the Republican Party endorsed Justice G. Barry 
Anderson and Court of Appeals Judges Christopher Dietzen and 
Gordon Shumaker.  All three declined the endorsements.121  Only 
two candidates for the district court sought and obtained political 
party endorsement, both Republicans: State Representative Scott 
Newman in the First Judicial District, and Child Support Magistrate 
Tim Tingelstad in the Ninth Judicial District.122  In the Second 
Judicial District, St. Paul City Council Member Jay Benanav often 
reminded voters of his DFL background, and called his opponent 
Judge Elena Ostby a “Republican appointee.”123
 
 115. 1996 to 2006 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARIES, supra note 64. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See George Soule, Judicial Election in Minnesota: Past, Present, and Future, 
HENNEPIN LAW., Jan. 2007 at 7. 
 118. Brad Swenson, Tingelstad Says Judges Must Serve Up Impartial Justice, BEMIDJI 
PIONEER, Sept. 10, 2006, at A15. 
 119. See MINN. FAMILY INST., VOTER’S GUIDE 2004 (on file with author). 
 120. See REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINN., STATEWIDE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS VOTER 
GUIDE (2004) (detailing the judicial candidates’ educational and professional 
backgrounds, some of their community involvements, and some excerpts from 
their opinions) (on file with author). 
 121. Conrad deFiebre, Republican State Convention: Notebook; GOP Delegates Want 
Voter OK on Stadium Tax, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 3, 2006, at 8A. 
 122. Swenson, supra note 118; Michelle Lore, Eight Judicial Seats Contested, 
MINN. LAWYER, July 24, 2006, available at http://www.minnlawyer.com/story.cfm? 
ID=28898. 
 123. Shannon Prather, Judicial Candidates Spar Over Politics, ST. PAUL PIONEER 
PRESS (Minnesota), Oct. 27, 2006, at 1B. 
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There was some evidence in Minnesota’s 2006 elections that 
voters penalized candidates for their partisan campaign activities.124  
Mr. Newman drew criticism for seeking partisan support, and later 
in the campaign he rarely featured his Republican endorsement.125  
Judge Michael Savre defeated Mr. Newman, fifty-six percent to 
forty-four percent.126  Mr. Tingelstad placed third in the primary 
election, ending his candidacy.127  Despite widespread name 
recognition, Mr. Benanav lost the election to Judge Ostby, fifty-
eight percent to forty-one percent.128  Nationally, candidates who 
focused on political or disputed legal issues “lost more often than 
they won.”129
VI. THE THREATS OF PARTISANSHIP 
A. Supreme Court Races in Partisan Election States 
In considering what Minnesota may face if judicial elections 
become more partisan, recent races in partisan election states 
provide a ready source of information.  In ten states, candidates are 
commonly identified with a political party or seek judicial election 
on partisan ballots.130  There are several recent examples of partisan 
slugfests in these states. 
One race in Illinois in 2004 set a national record for spending 
in a single state supreme court race; the candidates in Illinois’s 
Fifth Judicial District, a rural district in southern Illinois, raised 
more than $9.3 million.131  Business interests supporting 
Republican Judge Lloyd Karmeier and plaintiffs’ lawyers and labor 
groups supporting Democratic Judge Gordon Maag poured 
millions of dollars into the race.132
 124. See infra text and accompanying notes 125–29. 
 125. See Lee Ostrom, Editorial, Need To Ensure Judicial Independence, MCLEOD 
COUNTY CHRON., Apr. 21, 2006. 
 126. SOS Election Results, supra note 64. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006 35 
(Jesse Rutledge ed., 4th ed. 2007). 
 130. Id. at 25 (partisan election states are Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Michigan, North Carolina, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and West 
Virginia).  
 131. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: 2004 
18 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 3d ed. 2005). 
 132. Id. at 19. 
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In Alabama, races for the supreme court are often expensive, 
partisan free-for-alls.133  In June 2006, a slate of “pick-and-choose” 
candidates ran against incumbent Republican justices.134  The 
challengers were so called because they contended that the 
Alabama Supreme Court should not obey rulings of the United 
States Supreme Court with which the Alabama justices disagreed.135  
In particular, they urged defiance of the United States Supreme 
Court decision that banned the death penalty for defendants 
convicted of murders committed when they were minors.136  The 
challengers were led by Justice Tom Parker, a follower of former 
Chief Justice Roy Moore.137
Campaign messages based on hot-button political issues were 
common in the 2006 Alabama races.138  Chief Justice Drayton 
Nabers, for example, told voters that “[i]ssues relating to the right 
to life and the sanctity of marriage are in the soul of Alabamians, 
and they want a judge who shares their conservative views.”139  
Justice Parker accused Chief Justice Nabers of backing “the same 
precedents that allow abortion up to the date of delivery” and 
“would enforce a federal court order mandating Alabama legalize 
gay marriages.”140
The “pick-and-choose” candidates all lost in the June 
primary,141 but the Republican incumbents faced Democratic 
challengers in the general election.142  Candidates spent $8.2 
million in the supreme court races.143  Chief Justice Nabers alone 
spent more than $4 million on his campaign, but he lost in the 
 133. See Drew Jubera, There’s Nothing Civil About Alabama Judicial Race, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST., June 5, 2006, at A2. 
 134. See Geri L. Dreiling, Pick and Choose Judicial Candidates Defeated: Alabama 
Voters Reject Slate That Argued It Could Ignore U.S. Supreme Court Rulings, ABA J., June 
9, 2006, available at http://www.abanet.org/journal.ereport.jn9parker.html. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Tom Parker, Editorial, Alabama Justices Surrender to Judicial Activism, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 1, 2005, available at http://www.alliancealert.org/2006/ 
20060106.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
 137. See SAMPLE ET AL, supra note 129, at 4. 
 138. See Jubera, supra note 133. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See generally Ala. Sec’y of State, Alabama Secretary of State 2004 Republican 
Primary Results, http://www.sos.state.al.us/downloads/dl3.aspx?trgturl=election/ 
2004/primary/repcert-amend-6-11-2004.pdf&trgtfile=repcert-amend-6-11-2004.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2007). 
 142. See Brendan Kirby, Supreme Court Incumbents Fend Off Challenges, ALA. PRESS-
REGISTER, June 7, 2006 at A1. 
 143. SAMPLE ET AL, supra note 129, at 5. 
17
Soule: The Threats of Partisanship to Minnesota's Judicial Elections
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
8. SOULE - ADC.DOC 2/3/2008  3:54:10 PM 
718 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
 
general election to his Democratic opponent.144  The winner, Chief 
Justice Sue Bell Cobb, called the cost of the campaigns “obscene.”145
B. Partisan Trial Court Races 
Party politics often shape elections for local trial court seats in 
partisan election states.  The experience of Dallas County, Texas in 
2006 is instructive.  Before the 2006 election, all of the district 
judges were Republicans.146  In 2006, however, Democrats 
dominated county elections.147  Democratic challengers defeated 
twenty Republican judges.148  In eight contests for open seats, 
Democrats defeated Republicans.149  Five Republican judges 
retained their positions because they ran unopposed.150
Before the election, the Republican bench likely was varied in 
qualifications and competence, and the same is true about the 
largely Democratic bench after the election.151  Their selection had 
much to do about politics and little to do with merit: “Judging by 
the voting percentages in judicial races, the voters didn’t 
differentiate between the good and bad Democrats, nor the good 
and bad Republicans, opting for a wholesale party swap without 
regard to each candidate’s particular qualifications.”152  This type of 
partisan turnover in the judiciary detracts from stability of the 
bench and may discourage some of the best candidates from 
seeking appointment or election. 
C. The Wisconsin Experience—2007 
States like Illinois, Alabama and Texas are well known for 
partisanship in judicial elections.  Minnesota can also look to other 
 144. Phillip Rawls, Court Race Most Expensive in America, DECATUR DAILY, Feb. 2, 
2007. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Tex. Sec’y of State, 2002 General Election Dallas County Race Summary, 
http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
 147. Matt Pulle, Accidental Victors, DALLAS OBSERVER, Nov. 16, 2006, available at 
www.dallasobserver.com/2006-11-16/news/accidental-victors/full (“Last Tuesday, 
local Democrats . . . beat Republicans in every contested countywide race, as a 
rather lazy electorate lumped civil judges and obscure administrators with an 
unpopular war and president.”). 
 148. See Tex. Sec’y State, supra note 146. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Pulle, supra note 147. 
 152. Id. 
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Midwestern states with similar demographics and political outlook 
to consider whether partisanship can dominate judicial elections.  
The April 2007 election for an open seat on the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court is informative. 
In the election, Circuit Judge Annette Ziegler defeated 
Madison private lawyer Linda Clifford fifty-eight percent to forty-
two percent to replace a retiring Supreme Court justice.153  
Although Wisconsin’s judicial elections are non-partisan, Ziegler 
was identified as the Republican candidate, while Clifford was 
known as the Democratic candidate.154  The race cost a total of $6 
million.155  The candidates each raised over $1 million for their 
campaigns, including each candidate’s own “six-figure” loan.156  The 
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce and Club for Growth 
Wisconsin spent over $2 million in support of Ziegler, while 
“Democrat-leaning” Greater Wisconsin Committee spent $320,000 
on ads for Clifford.157  The business groups were apparently 
motivated by recent decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that 
“struck down caps on medical malpractice damages” and that 
allowed “a lawsuit against the lead-paint industry [to] continue” 
even without product identification.158
The victor in the race, Judge Ziegler, acknowledged that “the 
tone of the race troubled her, and that she wished third parties 
would stay out of judicial contests.”159  Candidate Clifford felt 
“disappointed in the fact that judicial elections in our state are now 
so overwhelmed by money . . . .”160  Nevertheless, the Wisconsin 
Manufacturers & Commerce reportedly views the next election as 
“an opportunity to solidify a conservative majority” on the court.161
 153. Wisconsin State Elections Board, Results of Spring General Election, 
http://elections.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=11121&locid=47 (last visited Dec. 
27, 2007). 
 154. See Patrick Marley, Ziegler Wins Court Seat, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 
2007, at A1. 
 155. Patrick Marley, Pricey Court Race Might Set New Pace, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2007, at B1. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Marley, supra note 154. 
 161. Id. 
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D. Characteristics of Partisan Judicial Elections 
The campaign participants and methods are often the same in 
partisan supreme court elections.  In recent years, business 
interests have squared off against plaintiffs’ lawyers and labor 
groups in supporting competing candidates.162  Many such elections 
have featured abundant television advertising, negative 
campaigning, and criticism of judges’ opinions in criminal cases.163  
Spending on television advertising in 2006 supreme court races 
topped $16 million.164  In contested supreme court elections since 
2000, only Minnesota and North Dakota have not featured 
television advertising.165
Many of the advertisements—sponsored by interest groups and 
by candidates—are attack ads, well known to voters in races for 
executive and legislative offices.166  Negative ads often feature 
criminal cases, even though their sponsors may have other 
motivations.  For example, in the 2004 election for West Virginia 
Supreme Court, a group financed by business ran advertisements 
accusing Justice Warren McGraw of “having assigned a known sex-
offender to work in a West Virginia high school.”167
Another growing factor in judicial elections is requests by 
interest groups for judicial candidates to declare their views on 
judicial and political issues.168  Conservative groups have distributed 
most questionnaires that often focus on issues such as abortion, 
school choice and same-sex marriage.169  Such groups publish and 
circulate responses, or a candidate’s lack of response, to their 
members.170  Most judicial candidates have declined to respond to 
issue-oriented questionnaires.171
 162. SAMPLE ET AL, supra note 129, at 1. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 3. 
 165. Id. at 2. 
 166. Id. at 1. 
 167. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 131, at 4. 
 168. Id. at 23. 
 169. Id. at 30. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 29. 
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VII. THE FUTURE OF MINNESOTA’S JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
A. Threats of Partisanship to Minnesota’s Judiciary 
Minnesotans are now wrestling with two issues: whether 
increasing partisanship in judicial elections would harm the state’s 
judiciary and citizens, and whether the partisanship displayed in 
other states is likely to materialize in Minnesota’s judicial elections. 
There is a lively debate on the first issue between the First 
Amendment activists—mostly Republicans or conservatives—and 
the state’s legal community.  The proponents of partisan elections 
contend that “politicizing the process [will] inform voters better 
about candidates for the bench.”172  They argue that “free and 
open” elections are necessary to prevent judicial activism and 
promote accountability.173
The prevailing position in the legal community is represented 
by the findings of the Citizens Commission for the Preservation of 
an Impartial Judiciary.  In response to changes fostered by White 
and its progeny, the Commission was formed in February 2006 “to 
review and make recommendations concerning the method of 
selection of Minnesota’s state court judges.”174  Former Governor Al 
Quie chaired the Commission, consisting of five judges and twenty-
five other members from the legal, business, labor and education 
communities.175
After a one-year study of the Minnesota system and the new 
judicial campaign freedoms, the Commission identified several 
“threats to our system of nonpartisan elections.”176  These threats 
included turning “Minnesota’s system of nonpartisan elections into 
partisan elections,” “pressing [candidates] to solicit financial 
support from those likely to have interests” in cases, allowing 
political parties and interests to elect judges to serve their “interests 
rather than follow the rule of law,” increasing the cost of judicial 
campaigns, inviting “interests to fund campaigns for the purpose of 
influencing judicial decisions,” and promoting negative 
 172. deFiebre, supra note 121. 
 173. William F. Mohrman, Wersal’s Attorney Responds to Blatz, MINN. LAWYER, 
June 19, 2000, at 3, 10. 
 174. CITIZENS COMM’N FOR THE PRES. OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY, FINAL REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2007) [hereinafter CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT]. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 5. 
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campaigning and television advertising.177  These activities 
“threaten a litigant’s fair day in court.”178
They also impair the core functions of courts to protect 
individual rights and liberties, check the legislative and 
executive branches to ensure they act within the bounds 
of their authority, protect and uphold the Minnesota and 
U.S. Constitutions, protect and uphold federal and state 
laws, and preserve and promote our democratic system of 
government.179
Judicial independence is the principle that judges should 
reach legal decisions free from outside pressures, strictly according 
to the law, and without fear of reprisal.180  If judges are 
independent, fair and impartial, then justice will be served.181  
Excessive partisanship in the selection process threatens judicial 
independence.  Justice may be impaired when judges think about 
how a decision may affect partisans or special interests, what 
campaign contributions may be gained or lost, or how a ruling may 
sit with the legislature.  Judicial independence is not absolute, but 
must be balanced with accountability. 
Partisan judicial elections focused on the hot-button issues of 
the day may also deceive voters.  Minnesota courts, especially 
district courts, rarely if ever issue rulings on issues such as abortion, 
gun control or same-sex marriage.182  Campaigns based on these 
issues may disingenuously distract voters from real issues, such as 
qualifications, experience, demeanor, and philosophy.  In addition, 
a candidate who takes positions on divisive issues may be 
 177. Id. at 5–6. 
 178. Id. at 7. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn. 1992). 
 181. See id. 
 182. See, e.g., Women of the State v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995) 
(holding that state statutes restricting women’s use of public assistance funds for 
therapeutic abortions were unconstitutional); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 
(Minn. 1990) (answering certified question that the state unborn child homicide 
statutes were constitutional); Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 
(Minn. 1986) (holding state statute barring wrongful birth actions was 
constitutional); In re Application of Atkinson, 219 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1980) 
(commenting on standards for gun permits); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 
N.W.2d 185 (1971) (stating that state statute did not authorize marriage between 
same-sex couples); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995) (upholding judgment enjoining city from extending health benefits to 
partners of employees in same-sex domestic partnerships). 
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disqualified from presiding over proceedings involving those 
issues.183
Turning judicial elections into partisan battlegrounds, 
targeted by special interests with large war chests, may provide a 
significant disincentive for prospective judicial candidates.  Many 
lawyers who would be good judges have little political background 
and are wary of running a high-profile election campaign.184  They 
want to focus on being good judges, not politicians.185  If elections 
turn out to be partisan, expensive battles, many qualified judicial 
candidates may be deterred.186
B. The Encroachment of Partisanship in Minnesota’s Judicial Elections 
As the First Amendment litigation and Republican Party 
endorsements have shown, there are legal and political activists 
pushing for more partisanship in Minnesota’s judicial elections.187  
While these activists have succeeded in changing the rules of 
judicial elections, both in-state and nationally, they have not yet 
significantly affected the state’s judicial campaigns or elections.188
There are a number of factors that will impede efforts to 
politicize Minnesota’s judicial elections.  First, because judicial 
offices are non-partisan, party affiliations of candidates will not 
appear on the ballot like they do in partisan election states.189  
Second, the state has developed a culture of non-partisanship in its 
judiciary, an outlook firmly held by the majority of the state’s legal 
community.190  Third, Minnesota courts have not ruled on many 
hot-button issues in recent years.191  Finally, the movement to make 
judicial elections more partisan has not gained traction in the 
state’s business community.  While business groups are active in 
 183. See MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(1)(e) (2007). See 
generally 10 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Courts § 5.08 (5th ed. 2003) (detailing general 
information on disqualification of judges for bias and interpreting the judicial 
code). 
 184. See Peterson, 490 N.W.2d at 422–423. 
 185. See id. (noting that practitioners fear giving up their livelihoods “only to 
be defeated by a politician with a popular name at some future election”). 
 186. See id. 
 187. See supra Parts IV, V. 
 188. See supra Part V. 
 189. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 4. 
 190. See id. (the Commission recommended changes to the judicial selection 
process in Minnesota to preserve non-partisanship after federal court decisions 
granted rights to candidates to run partisan campaigns). 
 191. See supra note 182. 
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partisan elections in other states, the business community in 
Minnesota appears to be quite content with the state’s judiciary.  A 
recent study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for 
Legal Reform ranked Minnesota’s court system second in the 
nation for its “fairness in the litigation environment.”192
While these factors may stabilize non-partisan judicial elections 
in the next several years, the state will likely lose its immunity from 
partisanship.  A society deeply divided by many social and 
economic issues, and prone to resolve many disputes by lawsuits, 
may force the courts to make rulings that will disappoint one side 
or the other.  Nationally, and at the State Capitol, the winds of 
partisanship blow strongly.  It is doubtful that tradition and culture 
can resist these political factors for many years to come.193
VIII.     POTENTIAL REFORMS TO DETER PARTISAN ELECTIONS 
A. Changes to the Selection Process 
The Citizens Commission for the Preservation of an Impartial 
Judiciary issued its Final Report and Recommendations in March 
2007.194  The Commission majority proposed a constitutional 
amendment that would substitute retention elections for non-
partisan elections as the method of determining whether 
incumbent judges would serve another term.195  The Commission 
also recommended that the governor appoint all Minnesota judges 
 192. Inst. for Legal Reform, State Res. Ctr.: Minn., http://www.institutefor 
legalreform.com/states/state.cfm?state=MN&submit=go (last visited Dec. 27, 
2007); see also INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LAWSUIT CLIMATE 2007: RATING THE STATES, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/lawsuitclimate 
2007/pdf/Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
 193. Officials of Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life (MCCL), an anti-
abortion organization, stated that the group plans to be active in judicial elections.  
Barbara L. Jones, With ‘White’ Now the Law, Judicial Races Are in For a Change, MINN. 
LAWYER, Jan. 30, 2006.  The group has announced that it will support a challenger 
to Justice Paul Anderson in 2008.  Id.  “We’ll be working to replace him with 
someone who will not be an activist, will not legislate from the bench, and will 
uphold the constitution in its text and history.” Id. 
 194. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174. 
 195. Id. at 21–23.  This is the third time in the last sixty years in which an 
independent commission has recommended adoption of retention elections.  The 
1948 Constitutional Commission and 1972 Constitutional Study Commission 
“urged the adoption of a retention-type election for incumbent judges.” Hon. 
Lawrence R. Yetka & Christopher H. Yetka, The Selection and Retention of Judges in 
Minnesota, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 169, 174-75 (1994). 
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from candidates nominated by merit selection commissions.196  
Presently, there is no statutory requirement that a commission 
screen candidates for appellate judgeships, and the governor is 
constitutionally free to select district judges regardless of the 
nominations of the Minnesota Commission on Judicial Selection.197  
Finally, the Commission recommended evaluation of judges’ 
performances by an independent commission, and publication on 
the retention ballot whether the evaluation commission found the 
judge “qualified” or “not qualified.”198
The Commission majority favored retention elections over 
non-partisan elections, concluding that retention elections 
“promote judicial accountability based on quality and 
performance.”199  The Commission found that “information 
regarding the quality and performance of judges” would influence 
voters in retention elections.200  The record in retention election 
states showed that a campaign against a specific judge did not 
influence voters to defeat all the judges on the ballot.201
A minority of the Commission favored an appointive model for 
judicial selection.202  The proposal called for merit selection and 
gubernatorial appointment, but also for a “judicial-evaluation 
commission” rather than the voters in a retention election to 
determine renewal of judges’ terms.203  The proponents of an 
appointive system argued that it would diminish the role of 
partisanship and money in judicial selection, would “better insulate 
judges from electoral politics,” and a judicial-evaluation 
commission would be better informed than voters in deciding 
whether a judge should serve another term.204
A second appointive model, requiring legislative confirmation 
of gubernatorial appointments and renewals of judges’ terms was 
discussed by the Commission, was favored by one member, and has 
been proposed in the legislature.205  The Commission, however, 
 196. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 11. 
 197. See MINN. STAT. § 480B.01 (2006). 
 198. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174. 
 199. Id. at 22. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.; see also Larry Aspin et al., Thirty Years of Retention Elections: An Update, 
37 SOC. SCI. J. 1, 8−11 (2000). 
 202. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 25-33. 
 203. Id. at 30−31. 
 204. Id. at 31. 
 205. Id. at 33−39; S.F. 324, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007) (sponsored by 
Sen. Thomas Neuville).  Senator Neuville’s bill would require Senate confirmation 
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found little support among its members for legislative involvement 
in judicial selection.206
Retention elections provide a good balance between judicial 
independence and accountability.207 This system promotes stability 
in the bench because it is likely that good judges will be retained.208  
Retention elections also provide a mechanism to remove a judge 
who has behaved badly or whose performance has not been 
satisfactory.209  In this system, the citizens have a voice in who serves 
on the bench, but its structure mitigates partisanship.210
B. Financing Elections 
 In 2004, North Carolina became the first state in the country 
to offer full public financing to appellate court candidates.211  In 
2001 New Mexico joined North Carolina by providing full public 
financing for statewide judicial elections.212  In signing the New 
Mexico bill into law, Governor Bill Richardson commented that 
“[p]ublic financing helps assure that Court of Appeals and 
Supreme Court judges can run for office without the pressures of 
partisan campaigning or fundraising . . . .”213
Wisconsin has public financing of judicial elections as well, but 
does not fully fund campaigns like systems in North Carolina and 
of the governor’s appointments.  Id.  Elections would be abolished and judges 
could apply to the Senate for reappointment after a six-year term.  Id. 
 206. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 33. 
 207. Aspin et al., supra note 201, at 2. “Merit selection combined with 
retention elections is designed to obtain qualified judges, insulate those judges 
from political influences by removing partisan politics from the judicial selection 
process, and still provide a mechanism for removal of judges through public 
accountability.”  Id. 
 208. Id. at 8 (fifty defeated judges out of 3912 retention elections in 1964–
1994). “[R]egular retention voters are very precise in singling out a judge for 
defeat” while “retention losses are accompanied by little collateral damage” to 
other judges.  Id. at 11−12. 
 209. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 21−22. 
   210.     Aspin, et al., supra note 201, at 1−17.   
 211. N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 163-278.61 (2005); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 131, at 
vii. 
 212. 2007 N.M. Legis. Serv. 1658−63 (West).
 213. Press Release, Office of New Mexico Governor, Governor Richardson 
Signs Landmark Public Campaign Financing Bill; Makes State Second in Nation 
To Provide Public Financing for Statewide Judicial Elections, April 13, 2007, 
available at http://governor.state.nm.us/press/2007/april/041307 01.pdf. 
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/9
8. SOULE - ADC.DOC 2/3/2008  3:54:10 PM 
2008] JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 727 
 
New Mexico.214  In the 2007 Wisconsin Supreme Court election, 
both candidates declined the public subsidies.215  The candidates 
would “have received about $48,000 each if they had agreed to limit 
their overall spending to $215,000 and not lent their campaigns 
more than $20,000 each.”216  However, the candidates each raised 
over $1 million in their campaigns.217
Although contributions to Minnesota judicial candidates must 
be disclosed publicly, there are no limits on the amount of such 
contributions.218  Raising sufficient funds to run an effective judicial 
campaign has been difficult, and campaign war chests have been 
relatively small.219  Anticipating potential problems from excessive 
campaign contributions in future elections, legislators have 
proposed limits on the amount of contributions.  One proposal 
would limit such contributions to $2000 per contributor in an 
election year and $500 per contributor in other years.220
IX. CONCLUSION 
Minnesota’s judicial selection system of appointments and 
elections has worked well to maintain a non-partisan, fair and 
impartial judiciary. In the last five years, however, the rules of 
judicial campaign conduct have changed profoundly.  While 
Minnesota is better situated than most states to resist partisanship 
in its judicial elections, the barriers to partisanship find their basis 
in political will, not in legal boundaries. Once ignited, the flames of 
partisanship could overcome tradition and culture. 
For the third time in the last sixty years, an independent 
commission has recommended a constitutional amendment to 
adopt retention elections to improve Minnesota’s judicial selection 
 214. WIS. STAT. § 11.50 (Supp. 2006).  Wisconsin has considered fully funded 
judicial campaigns.  See Mike McCabe, Exec. Dir. Wis. Democracy Campaign, 
Campaign Finance Reform in Wisconsin: Where We’ve Been, Where Things Stand Today 
and Where We Go From Here (Oct. 17, 2002), http://www.wisdc.org/campfinreform_ 
progrpt.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2007). 
 215. Marley, supra note 154. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. MINN. STAT. §10A.20 (2006). 
 219. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 220. S.F. 1558, 85th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007).  The 2007 ABA Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct uses the same method of setting contribution limits, with 
different limits in election and non-election years, but leaves the actual amounts to 
be set by states.  See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4(B)(1) (2007), 
available at http://abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf. 
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process.221 Minnesota’s judicial elections already share several 
characteristics of retention elections: there are few open seats up 
for election; most good judges are not challenged for election; 
judges are identified as incumbents on the election ballot; and 
incumbents can be defeated if they behave or perform badly.222 As 
in retention election states, most judges in Minnesota are 
appointed by the governor after nomination by a merit selection 
commission.223
Retention elections strike a good balance between 
independence and accountability, and provide more protection 
against partisanship than the present election system.  Minnesotans 
would be wise to make the change to retention elections now, 
before judicial selection becomes embroiled in partisanship. 
 
 221. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 22−23 (Appendix C). 
 222. Id. at 7−8. 
 223.  
It seems clear that Minnesota has adopted its own middle-of-the-road 
approach to judicial selection.  The open election process has been 
retained, but with a quasi-retention feature which simply informs the 
voter who the incumbent candidate is and who the challenger is.  This 
arrangement acts as a check on the gubernatorial appointment process 
by keeping the ultimate choice with the voters while, at the same time, 
recognizing the unique independent nature of the judicial function.    
Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 425 (Minn. 1992). 
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